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Abstract
Strongly unforgeable signature schemes provide a more stringent security guarantee than the
standard existential unforgeability. It requires that not only forging a signature on a new message
is hard, it is infeasible as well to produce a new signature on a message for which the adversary
has seen valid signatures before. Strongly unforgeable signatures are useful both in practice and
as a building block in many cryptographic constructions.
This work investigates a generic transformation that compiles any existential-unforgeable
scheme into a strongly unforgeable one, which was proposed by Teranishi et al. [30] and was proven
in the classical random-oracle model. Our main contribution is showing that the transformation
also works against quantum adversaries in the quantum random-oracle model. We develop proof
techniques such as adaptively programming a quantum random-oracle in a new setting, which
could be of independent interest. Applying the transformation to an existential-unforgeable
signature scheme due to Cash et al. [10], which can be shown to be quantum-secure assuming
certain lattice problems are hard for quantum computers, we get an efficient quantum-secure
strongly unforgeable signature scheme in the quantum random-oracle model.
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1 Introduction
Digital signature is a fundamental primitive in modern cryptography and has numerous
applications. In a signature scheme, a signer uses his/her secret key to generate a signature
on a message. Anyone who knows the corresponding public key can verify the integrity of the
message and that it comes from the genuine signer. A standard security notion for digital
signatures is called existential-unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message-attacks (eu-acma
in short). Basically it means that an adversary, without knowing the secret key of a user,
cannot forge a valid signature on a new message. This should hold even if the adversary
has seen a few signatures generated by the honest user on messages adaptively chosen by
the adversary. Another important security notion, stronger than eu-acma, is called strongly
existential-unforgeable (su-acma). Here, in addition to eu-acma, it should be infeasible to
forge a new signature on a previously signed message. Aside from applications in some
practical scenarios [26], su-acma signatures turn out to be a very powerful tool in other
cryptographic constructions. For instance they are used in transforming encryption schemes
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2 EU to SU in QRO
that are secure under chosen-plain-text attacks into secure schemes under chosen-ciphertext-
attacks [13, 6]; and in constructing identity-based blind signatures [15] and group signature
schemes [2, 5].
Strongly unforgeable signature schemes can be obtained from existential-unforgeable ones
via generic transformations [29, 18, 30]. The transformation in [30] (referred to as TOO
hereafter) is particularly interesting because it only needs a mild computational assumption
and the overhead it causes to the efficiency is small. This work studies this transformation in
the quantum setting, where adversaries have the power of processing quantum information.
We want to ask: does TOO transformation still hold in the presence of quantum adversaries,
and furthermore can we obtain quantum-secure su-acma signatures systematically?
There is no quick answer to this question. In general a classically secure cryptographic
construction can completely fall apart against quantum adversaries for at least two reasons.
First of all, quantum computers can solve some problems efficiently which are otherwise
believed hard classically. This breaks the computational assumption in many constructions.
For example, many existing eu-acma signature schemes, the starting point of the trans-
formation, are based on factoring or discrete logarithm. The TOO transformation itself
also uses the discrete logarithm problem. They are immediately broken by Shor’s quantum
algorithms [27]. Naturally we may want to switch to quantum-safe assumptions. For ex-
ample, we assume certain lattice problems are hard even against quantum algorithms and
then construct crypto-systems based on them [25, 4]. However, this does not fix everything
immediately due to another reason, which is more subtle. Security of a construction is es-
tablished by a security reduction, which is a proof by contradiction showing that if a scheme
is not secure, then one can break a computational assumption. Unfortunately, as pointed
out by a line of works (e.g., [35, 16, 31, 28]), classical security reductions may not hold in
the presence of quantum adversaries due to technical difficulties such as quantum rewinding.
There is an additional complication, which turns out to be the main difficulty towards
making the TOO transformation go through in the quantum setting. Classically, TOO is
proven in the random-oracle model (RO), where a hash function is treated as a truly random
function and all users evaluate the hash function by querying the random function. However
once an adversary becomes quantum, we should naturally allow the queries to be in quantum
superposition. This is formalized as the quantum random-oracle model (QRO) [7]. The bad
news is that many classical tricks in RO become difficult to apply in QRO, if not entirely
impossible. For starters, classically it is trivial to answer random-oracle queries on-the-fly by
generating fresh random value for new queries while maintaining a table to keep consistency.
It is not obvious that some similar trick can handle quantum superposition queries. There
have been a host of works in recent years developing proof techniques in QRO [36, 33, 32],
but many classical techniques are still missing their counterparts in QRO.
Our Contributions. Our main result is showing that the TOO transformation still works
against quantum adversaries in the quantum random-oracle model under reasonable com-
putational assumptions. Specifically, we first make a simple observation that classically
the TOO transformation actually holds using any (generic) chameleon hash function, rather
than the specific instantiation by the discrete log problem. As our central contribution, we
prove that once the chameleon hash function and the eu-acma signature scheme are both
quantum-safe, then TOO transformation will produce a quantum-safe su-acma signature
scheme in the quantum random-oracle model. In our proof, we develop a technique that
allows for adaptively programming a quantum random-oracle in a new setting. We hope
this technical can find applications and extensions elsewhere.
Once we have the transformation ready, we demonstrate instantiations of the building
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blocks to obtain concrete quantum-safe su-acma schemes. Using tools from [28], it is easy to
verify that the bonsai-tree signature scheme by Cash et al. [10] is eu-acma against quantum
adversaries assuming some lattice problem is quantum-safe1. In [10], a chameleon hash
function was also proposed based on the same computational assumptions, which is easy to
check that it is quantum-safe as well. Putting these pieces together, we can get a quantum-
safe su-acma scheme.
Overview of Our Proof Techniques in QRO. As we mentioned earlier, many proof
techniques in classical RO do not immediately go through in the QRO model. Roughly
speaking, the classical proof for the TOO transformation relies on two features in the classical
RO model: the history of queries that an adversary makes to the RO can the recorded,
and at various steps one can assign a fresh random value on an input, since the response
at an input needs not to be determined before being queried. Both become difficult in
the quantum setting. Copying quantum superposition queries which are unknown quantum
states is generally impossible, and apparently a single quantum query of the form
∑ |x, y〉 7→∑ |x,O(x) ⊕ y〉 would “see” the function values at all inputs. It is hence unclear how to
change O(x) later without being caught.
The first issue turns out to be non-essential. The purpose of keeping the RO queries is
to make sure some special input x∗ has not been queried by the adversary. Otherwise x∗
can be used to break some assumption. In the quantum setting, we can just pick one of the
queries at random and measure it. If the overall amplitude that adversary intends to query
at x∗ is high, the probability we recover x∗ is only reduced by essentially a poly-factor (the
number of the adversary’s RO queries).
We then come up with a technique for adaptively programming a QRO in a new setting.
Namely we want to change the function value at various inputs that the adversary has par-
tial control (e.g., the prefix of these inputs are chosen by the adversary). Intuitively this
is possible when these inputs still have sufficient uncertainty to the adversary. There exist
techniques previously when these input strings are information-theoretically undetermined,
possessing a high min-entropy for example [32, 34]. In contrast, in our case these inputs
are computationally difficult to decide by the adversary. Namely, these inputs remain un-
certain to the adversary unless some computational assumption is broken. We show that
this is already sufficient freedom for programming the answers on these inputs. Being a
little more specific, we show that the computational assumption implies indistinguishability
of two functions which a distinguisher can have quantum access to: one is the all-zero func-
tion, and the other marks a set of strings that could be used to break the computational
assumption. This may be interpreted as a computational analogue of the Grover search
lower bound in quantum query complexity. This enables us to program a quantum random-
oracle adaptively. Basically, the random-oracle embeds one of the preceding functions, and
programming the random-oracle roughly amounts to switching between the two functions.
Since the two functions are indistinguishable, any efficient quantum algorithm querying the
random-oracle cannot notice whether we have re-programmed the quantum random-oracle.
From a technical point of view, these claims may not sound very surprising. Nonetheless,
we view them as an interesting conceptual shift, which is similar in spirit to [11] where the
authors showed that computational constraints can force measurement on a quantum state
and cause collapse to particular subspaces. Our techniques also complements existing ones
that are of information-theoretical flavor.
1 Actually, we observe a tighter security reduction so that a slightly weaker assumption on the lattice
problem is sufficient.
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Related Works. Boneh and Zhandry [8] considered a stronger type of quantum attacks
on signature schemes where an adversary can query a signing oracle in superposition. They
proposed general transformations which amplify schemes that are secure against ordinary
quantum adversaries (i.e., those who only issue classical signing query as we consider in
this work), to achieve security under attacks with superposition signing queries. In con-
trast, the transformation in our work only considers ordinary quantum adversaries, but
tries to amplify in terms of the type of forgeries that an adversary can produce. Lyuba-
shevsky [21, 22] applied the Fiat-Shamir paradigm to construct lattice-based su-acma sig-
natures in the random-oracle model from identification schemes. However whether these
schemes are quantum-secure is unclear, because proving quantum security of the identifica-
tion schemes faces the difficulty of quantum rewinding. More importantly, there is negative
evidence that Fiat-Shamir paradigm may not hold in general in the QRO model [12, 1].
Dagdelen et al. [12] showed that a variant of Fiat-Shamir works in the QRO model, but only
for a very special form of identification schemes. In a recent work by Unruh [34], a general
transformation is proposed, which can produce (quantum-safe) strongly-unforgeable signa-
tures in the QRO model from general Σ-protocols. However the overhead is much larger
than the Fiat-Shamir transformation, and the resulting signature schemes are less efficient
than what can be obtained from our work. We remark that there is a generic Merkle-tree
approach that produces su-acma schemes out of su-acma one-time signature schemes, which
should still hold against quantum adversaries. Therefore in principle, lattice-based one-time
signatures, as in [23], would suffice for full-fledged quantum-safe su-acma schemes. However
the resulting scheme is usually far less efficient and costly to manage (because it is typically
stateful).
2 Preliminary
We review necessary definitions and cryptographic tools in this section.
I Definition 1 (Signature Scheme). A signature scheme is composed of a triplet of prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms (G,S, V ), satisfying the following:
G is the key generation algorithm. On running, it produces a pair, (pk, sk). pk is the
public key, or verification key, while sk is the secret key, or signing key.
S is the signing algorithm. Upon input of a message M from a message space M, as
well as a secret key sk, it produces a signature σ on that message.
V is the verification algorithm. It takes in a message M , a signature σ, and a public key
pk, and will output either ‘accept’ or ‘reject’.
Signature schemes must satisfy the correctness requirement, which is that for any
(pk, sk) generated by G, and any M ∈M, if σ ← S(M, sk) then V (M,σ, pk) = ‘accept’.
A standard security notion for signature schemes is existential unforgeability under
adaptive chosen message attack (eu-acma).
I Definition 2 (Existential Unforgeability under Adaptive Chosen Message Attack). Consider
the following game between a challenger C and a forger A:
C runs G, and send the resulting pk to A.
A sends up to q messagesM1,M2, ...,Mq to C, one at a time. For each message C receives,
she sends back σi = S(Mi, sk) to A.
A finally outputs a pair (M∗, σ∗) to C. We call this a valid forgery if M∗ 6= Mi∀i ∈
{1, ..., q} and V (M∗, σ∗, pk) = ‘accept’.
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If, for polynomially bounded q, it is computationally infeasible for A to come up with
a valid forgery, the scheme is said to be existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen
message attack.
I Definition 3 (Strong Unforgeability under Adaptive Chosen Message Attack). Strong un-
forgeability under Adaptive Chosen Message attack, or su-acma, is defined in the
same way as eu-acma, except that the pair (M∗, σ∗) that A eventually submits must only
require that (M∗, σ∗) 6= (Mi, σi) for all i, instead of the requirement that M∗ 6= Mi. This
change means that the forgery A submits may either be a new message, or may be a message
that C has already signed, but with a new signature.
Note that by allowing A to submit more kinds of forgeries, if it is still computationally
infeasible for A to succeed, then we know that this type of forgery also cannot be created,
making the scheme in a sense stronger.
Chameleon hash functions. Chameleon hash functions were introduced by Krawczyk
and Rabin [19]. We need a slight generalization proposed in [10]. A family H of chameleon
hash function is a collection of functions h that takes in a message m from a message space
M and some randomness r from a randomness space R, and outputs to a range Y, ie,
h : M× R → Y. The randomness space is associated with some efficiently sampleable
distribution. There are three properties we need for a family of chameleon hash functions:
(Chameleon property) We require an algorithm HG that samples a hash function h ∈ H
together with trapdoor information td satisfying that for any m ∈ M and y ∈ Y, it is
possible to efficiently sample r ← h−1td (m, y) under the distribution associated with R
such that h(m, r) = y.
(Uniformity) For h← H and r ← R, (h, h(m, r)) is uniform over (H,Y) up to negligible
statistical distance.
(Collision resistance) For a hash function h← H, it is computationally infeasible for an
adversary to find (m, r), (m′, r′), with (m, r) 6= (m′, r′) such that h(m, r) = h(m′, r′).
Quantum Random-Oracle Model. The random oracle model is a technique used in
cryptographic proofs. In it, Hash functions are replaced with random oracles. An adversary
is given access to query this random oracle by providing an input, x, and is returned the
response, O(x). These random oracles exist to replace hash functions in our proof. When
we examine the proof in the context of quantum computers, Boneh et al. [7] have pointed
out that since superposition queries to hash functions are possible, to truly capture this in
a model allowing quantum computers, we must allow superposition queries to the random
oracle. So we will allow superpositions of queries to our random oracle,
∑
ax|x, y〉, which
will be responded to with a superposition of answers,
∑
ax|x, y ⊕O(x)〉.
A cryptographic scheme is said to be quantum-safe (or quantum-secure) if the security
conditions still hold once the adversaries become efficient quantum computers. We do not
go into more precise definitions. See for example [16] for details.
3 Getting SU from EU in QRO
In this section we prove our main theorem.
I Theorem 4. There exists a generic conversion that takes an quantum-safe eu-acma signa-
ture scheme Σ = (G,S, V ) and a family of quantum-safe collision-resistant chameleon hash
functions H and produces a quantum-safe su-acma signature scheme Σ′ = (G′, S′, V ′) in the
quantum random-oracle model.
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3.1 The Transformation
We first recall the TOO transformation [30] with a minor change. We use a generic chameleon
hash function instead of an instantiation from the discrete log problem.
G′. On input a security parameter 1n, do the following:
Run G, obtaining (pk, sk).
Run HG obtaining a chameleon hash function h with trapdoor td.
Set pk′ = (pk, h) and sk′ = (sk, td).
S′. On input of message M , do the following:
Sample a random C from the range of h.
Sign C using the signing algorithm S, obtaining σ = S(C, sk)
Compute m = O(M‖σ), where O is a hash function (to be replaced with a random
oracle in the proof).
Using the trapdoor information td, find an r such that h(m, r) = C.
Output σ′ = (σ, r).
V ′. On input of a message M and a signature σ′ = (σ, r), do the following:
Compute m = O(M‖σ) and C = h(m, r).
Output ’Accept’ if and only if V (C, σ, pk) = ’Accept’ (otherwise, output ’Reject’).
The correctness of the algorithm can be seen easily. If σ′ was a signature generated on
M using S′, then C will be the same C generated during the running of S′, and is precisely
what σ is a signature for.
3.2 Main Technical Lemma: Adaptively Programming a Quantum RO
To prove the main theorem, we demonstrate a new scenario where we can adaptively program
a quantum random-oracle. This extends existing works (e.g [32, 33, 34]) from information-
theoretical setting to a computational setting, and we believe it is potentially useful else-
where. We will formalize a probabilistic game which we call witness-search. It potentially
captures the essence of numerous security definitions for cryptographic schemes (e.g. sig-
natures). Then we show that the (computational) hardness of witness-search allows for
adaptively programming a quantum random-oracle.
Let Samp be an instance-sampling algorithm. On input 1n, Samp generates public infor-
mation pk, description of a predicate P , and a witness w satisfying P (pk, w) = 1. Define a
witness-search game WS as below.
Witness-Search Game WS
1. Challenger C generates (pk, w, P )← Samp(1n). Ignore w. LetWpk := {w : P (pk, w) =
1} be the collection of valid witnesses.
2. A receives pk and produces a string wˆ as output.
3. We say A wins the game if wˆ ∈Wpk.
We say WS(Samp) is hard, if for any poly-time A, Pr[A wins] ≤ negl(n). For instance,
Samp could be the KeyGen algorithm of a signature scheme. pk consists of the public key
and description of the signature scheme. Predicate P is the verification algorithm and a
witness consists of a valid message-signature pair. Security of the signature scheme implies
hardness of WS(Samp).
I Lemma 5 (Hardness of Witness-Search to Programming QRO). Let two experiments E and
E′ be as below. If WS is hard, then ADV := |PrE [b = 1]− PrE′ [b = 1]| ≤ negl(n) .
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Note that E′ differs from E only in that we reprogram the random oracle at some point
in E′. We defer the proof of this lemma to Appendix ??.
Experiment E
1. Generate (pk, w, P )← Samp(1n).
2. O ← F is drawn uniformly at random from the collection of all functions F .
3. A1 receives pk as input and makes at most q1 queries to O. A1 produces a classical
string x.
4. Set z := O(x‖w).
5. A2 gets (x,w, z) and may access the final state of A1. A2 makes at most q2 queries
to O. It outputs b ∈ {0, 1} at the end.
Experiment E′
1. Generate (pk, w, P )← Samp(1n).
2. O ← F is drawn uniformly at random from the collection of all functions F .
3. A1 makes at most q1 queries to O. It produces a classical string x.
4. Pick a random z ∈R Range(O). Reprogram O to O′: O′(y) = O(y) except that
O′(x‖w) = z.
5. A2 gets (x,w, z) and may access the final state of A1. A2 makes at most q2 queries
to O′. It outputs b ∈ {0, 1} at the end.
To prove Lemma 5, we need another lemma below to pave the road. Roughly we want to
argue that if witness-search is hard, then given an oracle which is either the all-zero function
or a function that marks the witness set Wpk, no efficient algorithms can distinguish them.
This may be intuitively interpreted as a computational analogue of Grover search lower
bound. Its proof can be found in Appendix B.
I Lemma 6. Let f be the all-zero function, and fS be the characteristic function of a set
S. Namely fS(x) = 1 iff. x ∈ S. Define two experiments G and G′ as below. If WS(Samp)
is hard, then for any efficient A making q ≤ poly(n) queries, |PrG[b = 1]− PrG′ [b = 1]| ≤
negl(n).
Experiment G
1. Generate (pk, w, P )← Samp(1n).
2. A is given pk and (quantum) access to f . A makes at most q queries to f and
afterwards w is given to A. It outputs b ∈ {0, 1} and aborts.
Experiment G′
1. Generate (pk, w, P ) ← Samp(1n). Let fpk := fWpk , where Wpk = {w : P (w) = 1}.
(i.e., fpk(x) = 1 iff. x ∈Wpk)
2. A is given pk and (quantum) access to fpk. A makes at most q queries to fpk and
afterwards w is given to A. It output b ∈ {0, 1} and aborts.
Proof of Lemma 5. We use a hybrid argument to prove the theorem. Define Ei, i = 1, . . . , 4
as follows.
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E1 := E. (AO1 /AO2 in short.)
E2: identical to E1 except that in step 3, O is replaced by O¯ where O¯(y) = O(y) but
O¯(y) = 0 for any y = ·‖w where w ∈Wpk. (AO¯1 /AO2 )
E3: identical to E2 except that after step 3, we use O′ as defined in E′ instead of O.
Observe that E3 can also be obtained from E′ by substitute O¯ for O in step 3. (AO¯1 /AO
′
2 )
E4 := E′. (AO1 /AO
′
2 )
Define ADVi :=
∣∣PrEi [b = 1]− PrEi+1 [b = 1]∣∣. We will show that ADV1 and ADV3 are
both negligible using Lemma 6. ADV2 = 0 since in both E2 and E3, the function values
for Wpk are assigned uniformly at random and independent of anything else. Therefore we
conclude that ADV = |PrE [b = 1]− PrE′ [b = 1]| ≤
∑
ADVi = negl(n).
We are only left to prove that ADV1 ≤ negl(n), and ADV3 ≤ negl(n) follows by similar
argument. Suppose for contradiction that there exist (A1,A2) such that ADV1 ≥ 1/p(n)
for some polynomial p(·). We show that this will lead to a contradiction to Lemma 6 that
|PrG[b = 1] − PrG′ [b = 1]| ≤ negl(n), which in turn contradicts the hardness of witness-
search. To see this, we construct an algorithm D from (A1,A2) that runs in G and G′ such
that |PrG[b = 1 : D]−PrG′ [b = 1 : D]| ≥ 1/p(n). Let F be an oracle which ignores the first
part of the input and then applies either all-zero function f or fpk (as defined in G′) on the
second part. Let g be a random function. Define another oracle H := g ◦F that implements
the following transformation:
|x, y〉 7→|x, y〉 ⊗ |0〉 append an auxiliary register
7→|x, y〉 ⊗ |F (x)〉 compute the negation of F on aux.
7→|x, y ⊕ F (x) · g(x)〉 ⊗ |F (x)〉 controlled-g
7→|x, y ⊕ F (x) · g(x)〉 uncompute negation of F and disgard aux.
Observe that if F is induced from f then H is identical to a random function O. Whereas if
F comes from fpk then H is identical to O¯ as in E2. For an algorithm that queries at most
q times to H, we can sample h from a family of 2q-wise independent functions and simulate
H efficiently (with access to F ) without any noticeable difference.
Construction of D
1. D receives pk and an oracle F (one of the two candidates above).
2. D simulates oracle H = g ◦ F as defined above. D then simulates A1, for each of
query from A1, it is answered by H with (two) oracle calls to F . Let x be the output
of A1.
3. D receives w (from external challenger). It then simulates A2 on input (x,w, z :=
H(x‖w)) and oracle queries are answered by h.
4. D outputs the output of A2.
It is easy to see that if F is induced from f , the view of A1 and A2 is identical to that of
E1. Likewise if F is induced by fpk then it is the same view as in E2. Therefore |PrG[b =
1 : D]− PrG′ [b = 1 : D]| = |PrE1 [b = 1 : (A1,A2)]− PrE2 [b = 1 : (A1,A2)]| ≥ 1/p(n). This
gives a contradiction.
J
3.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Brief Review of Classical Proof. Classical proof roughly goes as follows: consider a forger
A. If (M∗, σ′∗) is the forgery that A eventually submits, we will let C∗ = h(O(M∗‖σ∗), r∗).
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Similarly, for a signing query made by the forger Mi, we let Ci = h(O(Mi‖σi), ri).
We then analyze two separate cases. First the instance where C∗ 6= Ci for all i. In this
case we show that this gives a break to the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme
Σ, by way of (C∗, σ∗). Next, we examine the case where C∗ = Ci for some i. In this case
we show that (O(M∗||σ∗), r∗) and (O(Mi||σi), ri) provide a break to the collision resistance
of the chameleon hash function.
For completeness the full classical proof is included in Appendix A. It is adapted from [30]
and we use a generic chameleon hash function instead of a concrete instantiation from the
discrete logarithm problem. There are also changes which by our opinion make the proof
easier to understand.
Proof in the quantum random-oracle model. Let A be the forger making at most q
queries, and let  be the probability that A succeeds in her forgery. We construct B that
either breaks existential unforgeablity of Σ or can find collisions in H.
Case 1: We define this case as occurring when C∗ 6= Ci for all i.
Firstly, B will be acting as a quantum random oracle for C. To do this, B simply chooses
a 2q-wise independent hash function, O, and for any query A makes, Σαx,z|x, z〉, B
responds with Σαx,z|x,O(x)⊕ z〉.
Construction of Existential Forger B
1. B receives a public key pk from the challenger C
2. B simulates a variant of the strongly-unforgeable game with A:
i) B generates (h, td)← HG(1n). Initiate A with pk′ = (pk, h)
ii) B simulates a random-oracle using a 2q-wise independent hash function.
iii) On the ith signing query Mi from A, B chooses a random Ci. It then signs Ci
by submitting it to C, obtaining σi. It computes mi = O(Mi||σi), and using
the trapdoor information td, finds an ri such that h(mi, ri) = Ci. It sends
σ′i = (σi, ri) to A.
3. Let (M∗, (σ∗, r∗)) be the final forgery produced by A. Output (C∗, σ∗) as the forgery.
From A’s point of view, a 2q-wise independent function is identical to a random func-
tion [36]. Noting that C∗ 6= Ci for all i, and the Ci’s are precisely what was submitted to
C for signing queries, and finally, seeing as this is a valid forgery, so V (C∗, σ∗) =′ accept′,
we can see that B submits (C∗, σ∗) as a valid new forgery, breaking the existential un-
forgeability of Σ and winning his game with C. Thus in this case whenever A succeeds,
so does B, and so the probability B succeeds given we are in this case is .
Case 2: This case is defined as occurring when C∗ = Ci for some i. In this case we will
show a reduction to break the collision resistance of the chameleon hash function.
It is easy to see that B finds a valid collision as long as A produces a valid forgery,
with overwhelming probability. This is because if C∗ = Ci, then h(O(M∗||σ∗), r∗) =
h(O(Mi||σi), ri). We simply need to ensure that this is not a trivial collision. Note that
since this must be a new forgery, (M∗, σ∗, r∗) 6= (Mi, σi, ri). If r∗ 6= ri, we are done.
Otherwise, we can see thatM∗||σ∗ 6= Mi||σi, and thus since the values for O(Mi||σi) were
chosen uniformly at random, O(M∗||σ∗) 6= O(Mi||σi) with overwhelming probability.
Therefore if we let EVT be the event that A produces a valid forgery, we only need to
show that EVT occurs with probability Ω(ε) in the construction of B. We prove it by
a hybrid argument which transforms the standard strongly unforgeable game into the
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Construction of Collision-Finding Adversary B
1. B receives h from the challenger, which is sampled from the Chameleon hash function
family.
2. B, playing the role of a challenger, simulates a variant of the strongly-unforgeable
game with A:
i) B generates (pk, sk)← G(1n). Initialize A with pk′ = (pk, h). For i = {1, . . . , q},
B generates mi uniformly at random and ri ←R (according to the specification
of h). B computes Ci := h(mi, ri) and σi := S(sk, Ci).
ii) B simulates a random-oracle in the usual way (i.e. t-wise independent hash
function).
iii) On the ith signing query Mi from A, B reprograms the random-oracle:
O(Mi‖σi)← mi and returns (σi, ri) to A.
3. Let (M∗, (σ∗, r∗)) be the final forgery produced by A. We know C∗ = Ci for some i.
Output (O(M∗||σ∗), r∗), (O(Mi||σi), ri) as the collision.
variant as in the construction of B. We will show that the probablity of EVT is esstially
preserved in the hybrid argument.
Let Hyd0 the standard strongly-unforgeable game with A. By hypothesis Pr[EVT :
Hyd0] ≥ ε. Consider the first hybrid Hyd1 that makes only one change to Hyd0: when
the challenger answers a signing query, instead of querying the random-oracle O to
obtain mi := O(Mi‖σi), it samples a random mi and programs the random oracle so
that O(Mi‖σ) = mi. Note that in particular the challenger still uses the trapdoor to
find ri ← h−1(Ci,mi). By Lemma 5, we claim that2 Pr[EVT : Hyd0]−Pr[EVT : Hyd1]| ≤
negl(n). Specifically we instantiate Samp as follows. pk will consists of a public key for
Σ, hash function h, and random messages Ci. P will be the verification algorithm of
Σ. w := σi = S(sk, Ci) is the signature generated by B in 2.i), and Wpk consists of
all strings that form a valid signature of Ci under Σ. WS(Samp) is hard because Σ is
existential-unforgeable.
Hyd2 is obtained by a small change in Hyd1. Instead of sampling a random Ci, it is
obtained by computing h(mi, ri) from random (mi, ri). This change only causes (statis-
tically) a negligible error. This is because if h ← H and ri ← R then Ci := h(mi, ri)
will be uniformly random by the uniformity property of H. In addition the chameleon
property of H tells us that ri ← h−1td (Ci,mi) is distributed statistically close to sampling
ri ← R. Therefore the order of generating Ci and ri does not matter.
Thus we see that B is able to break the collision-resistance property of the Chameleon
hash function.
In sum, we have shown that if there is an adversary A breaking Σ′, then there is an
adversary who manages to break either the collision resistance of the chameleon hash func-
tion H, or the existential unforgeability of the original signature scheme Σ with probablity
Ω(ε). This contradicts the security of Σ and H if ε ≥ 1/poly(n). Thus we conclude that
Theorem 4 holds.
2 More precisely, we need to introduce sub-hybrids and each sub-hybrid makes such a change for just
one signing query.
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4 Discussion
Obtaining a quantum-safe su-acma signature scheme. In [10], the authors presented a
scheme for generating chameleon hash functions, based off the short integer solution problem
for lattices. They also demonstrate a reduction showing an efficient algorithm to break the
collision resistance of the hash function implies an efficient algorithm to break the short
integer solution problem for lattices. Using results from [28] this reduction can be shown to
carry through to the quantum setting. As this problem is currently believed to be hard even
for quantum computers, these chameleon hash functions’ collision resistance remains even
when faced with a quantum adversary. This chameleon hash function scheme can therefore
be used in the transformation in this paper to get a quantum-secure transformation. This
transformation, used with any quantum-safe eu-acma signature scheme will give a quantum-
safe su-acma scheme in the quantum random-oracle model.
When implementing the scheme with the chameleon hash function from [10] we can see
what the overhead would be in an actual realization. Let n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2, and m = O(n log q).
Let k be the output length of the hash function. Then the public key, pk′ will now carry
with it a Zn×mq matrix, so |pk′| = |pk|+n(k+m). The secret key now includes a specialized
lattice basis, which can be written as an m×m matrix over Zq, giving us |sk′| = |sk|+m2.
Finally, the signature overhead is the inclusion of a vector in Zmq , so |σ′| = |σ|+m.
A signature scheme based off the Short Integer Solution problem for lattices is also
presented in [10]. Examining the proof presented there with tools from [28], we can see
that this signature scheme is quantum-safe eu-acma. Applying this transformation to this
scheme, we obtain a quantum-safe su-acma signature scheme. In fact, we can show that
the reduction shown in [10] is not as tight as it could be, and for a message of length k
and at most Q queries, we can show that for adversary F and reduction S, we have that
ADVSIS(SF ) ≥ ADV(F)eu-acmaSIG /(Q(k−logQ)). This is a small improvement over the result
of the paper, showing that ADVSIS(SF ) ≥ ADV(F)eu-acmaSIG /(Q(k − 1) + 1)
Future directions. Our work has studied a very specific transformation that gives a
systematic way of getting quantum-safe su-acma signatures. There are a few more transfor-
mations in the plain model (i.e. without a random-oracle) [29, 20, 18, 17]. We conjecture
that they also hold against quantum adversaries. If this is the case, it will be meaningful
to evaluate all these transformations and figure out which one is preferable under specific
applications. On the other hand, we chose the Bonsai-tree signature scheme [10] to in-
stantiate the TOO transformation. There are many recent improvements on lattice-based
signatures in terms of key size and computational efficiency [9, 24, 14], which are shown
to be eu-acma classically. If they can be shown to be quantum-safe, they we can get more
efficient quantum-safe su-acma schemes in the quantum random-oracle model.
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A Classical Proof
Let A be the forger, B the reduction, and C be the challenger. In each case, B and A will
be playing a game of strong unforgeability. Let the probability that A succeeds be . In
Case 1, C and B will play a game of existential unforgeability on the signature scheme σ. In
case 2, C and B will play a game of collision resistance on the chameleon hash function h.
We show that if the probability A succeeds in her forgery is , then the probability that B
succeeds is ≥ 12− negl(n). At the beginning of the reduction, B will flip a coin, and guess
which case the adversary’s forgery will fall under. Clearly, B will be correct with probability
1
2 .
In our reduction, let the forgery that A eventually submits be (M∗, σ′∗ = (σ∗, r∗)) Let
C∗ = h(O(M∗||σ∗), r∗). Similarly, for each Mi the forger submits to the signing oracle for
signing, there is an associated σ′i and Ci.
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Case 1: C∗ 6= Ci for all i. We show that whenever the forger succeeds in creating a valid
forgery of this type, the reduction succeeds in breaking the existential unforgeability of
the original scheme Σ = (G,S, V ).
C and B will be playing a game of existential unforgeability, while B and A will be playing
a game of strong unforgeability. We will show that whenever A wins her game, B wins
his (so long as the forgery is of the type described above).
The games will play out as follows:
Firstly, B will act as the random oracle for A. In the first case at least (and this will
change only slightly case to case), he can do this in the following way. Whenever A
queries the random oracle with a query, B looks up in a maintained table if that query
has been made before. If it has, he responds with the value he responded with before.
If it has not, he generates a random number and responds with that.
Now we discuss how the game of strong unforgeability transpires.
C sends B a public key pk from the Σ scheme. B will generate a chameleon hash function
h, (with corresponding trapdoor td) and send the public key and hash function to A as
pk′ = (pk, h).
A will start submitting messages Mi to B for signing. For each query, B does the
following:
Choose a random m˜i and r˜i and compute Ci = H(m˜i, r˜i)
Sign Ci by submitting it to C as a signing query, obtaining σi
Query Mi||σi to the random oracle, obtaining mi = O(Mi||σi)
Using the trapdoor information td, find an ri such that h(mi, ri) = Ci.
σ′i = (σi, ri)
Send σ′i to A
Eventually, A will submit a valid forgery M∗, σ′∗ = (σ∗, r∗).
Then, B takes these, and computes C∗ = h(O(M∗||σ∗), r∗).
Noting that C∗ 6= Ci for all i, and the Ci’s are precisely what was submitted to C for sign-
ing queries, and finally, seeing as this is a valid forgery, so V (C∗, σ∗) =′ accept′, we can
see that B submits C∗, σ∗ as a valid new forgery, breaking the existential unforgeability
of Σ and winning his game with C.
Thus in this case whenever A succeeds, so does B, and so the probability B succeeds
given we are in this case is .
Case 2: This case is defined as occurring when C∗ = Ci for some i. In this case we will
show a reduction to break the collision resistance of the chameleon hash function.
To start with, C sends B the description of a chameleon hash function h, which B will
find a collision for.
B then runs the key generation algorithm of the signature scheme Σ, obtaining (pk, sk).
He then sends pk′ = (pk, h) to A.
For each signing query Mi that A sends to B, B does the following:
Choose a random mi and ri and compute C = h(mi, ri)
Sign Ci using the signing algorithm S, obtaining σ = S(C, sk)
Reprogram the random oracle so that O(Mi||σi) = mi.
σ′i = (σi, ri)
Send σ′i to A.
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Note that we have now permitted B to reprogram the random oracle for the purposes of
this proof. Thus it is necessary to show that A will still output a valid forgery.
When A eventually submits her forgery, (M∗, σ∗), we can see that C∗ = Ci for some
i. This implies that h(O(Mi||σi), ri) = h(O(M∗||σ∗), r∗) for that i. This shows us a
collision for the chameleon hash function h, which is what B is looking for. But we must
take care to ensure that it isn’t a trivial collision.
Note that (Mi, σi, ri) 6= (M∗, σ∗, r∗), simply because both the message and signature of
the forgery can’t be the same as that of one of the Mi’s. So at least one of these values
is different.
If ri 6= r∗, we are done. Otherwise, it must be the case that M∗||σ∗ 6= Mi||σi. In
this case, since the values for the random oracle are chosen uniformly at random, with
overwhelming probability, O(M∗||σ∗) 6= O(Mi||σi), giving B a collision for h.
So in this case, B will succeed as long asA does up to a negligible probability by Lemma 7.
So the probability B succeeds is ≥ − negl(n)
I Lemma 7. For a forger A, let B1 and B2 be as below, and have them play a game of
strong unforgeability with A. Then
|PrB1(A wins)− PrB2(A wins)| ≤ negl(n),
as long as the underlying signature scheme is existentially unforgeable.
B1 is defined to operate exactly as the transformation dictates. B2 will operate as B was
defined to in Case 2 above.
Proof. Say the difference in probability that A wins was not negligible. As the distribution
of all values is the same, the only difference from A’s perspective was that the value of
O(Mi||σi) was changed for each i.
But clearly the only way to have the information that they changed is if A had already
queried O(Mi||σi). But if A does this with non-negligible probability, then we could con-
struct a reduction to break the existential forgeability of the signature scheme by playing
strong unforgeability with A, and before submitting each Ci to the signing oracle, checking
to see if A had queried Mi||σi to the random oracle. With non-negligible probability, the
reduction finds a σi that is a valid forgery. So he submits this along with Ci and has broken
the existential unforgeability of the scheme. J
Therefore in both cases, as long as B successfully guesses which case the forgery will
fall under, he manages to successfully break either the collision resistance of the chameleon
hash function h, or the existential unforgeability of the original signature scheme Σ. Since B
correctly guesses what case he is in half of the time, his probability of success is≥ 12−negl(n).
B Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary algorithm running in G (or G′). Consider another algorithm
B that runs in an experiment EXT as follows:
Let pB := PrEXT [z ∈ Wpk] be the probability that the output of E is a valid witness.
Let  := |PrG[b = 1]− PrG′ [b = 1]|. In both experiment G and G′, pk is selected at random
according to Samp. Let Ppk be the probability that pk is outputted. Then
TQC’15
16 EU to SU in QRO
Extraction Experiment EXT
1. Generate (pk, w, P )← Samp(1n). Ignore w.
2. B receives pk and picks j ∈R {1, . . . , q} at random.
3. B simulates A on pk and (quantum) access to f . Just before A making the jth query
to f , B measures the register that contains A’s query. Let z be the measurement
outcome.
 =
∣∣∣Pr
G
[b = 1]− Pr
G′
[b = 1]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
pk
Pr
G
[b = 1|pk] · Ppk −
∑
pk
Pr
G′
[b = 1|pk] · Ppk
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
pk
Ppk
∣∣∣Pr
G
[b = 1|pk]− Pr
G′
[b = 1|pk]
∣∣∣ .
Let pk := |PrG[b = 1|pk]− PrG′ [b = 1|pk]|. Let |φi〉 be the superposition of AG on input
pk when the i’th query is made. Then let qy(|φi〉) be the sum of squared magnitudes in A
querying the oracle on the string y.
Let S = [q] ×Wpk. Let δpk =
∑
(i,y)∈S qy(|φpki 〉). We employ a theorem by Bennet et
al. [3], that states that ‖|φpki 〉 − |φ˜pki 〉‖ ≤
√
q · δpk. (Here |φ˜pki 〉 is defined in the same way
as |φpki 〉 but with G′ rather than G).
The same paper [3] also bounds the probability of being able to distinguish the two states,
which corresponds to our probability of distinguishing the two experiments, pk, telling us
that
pk ≤ 4 ·
∥∥∥|φpki 〉 − |φ˜pki 〉∥∥∥ ≤ 4√q · δpk .
Now note that P pkB (that is, the probability that EXT outputs a valid witness given pk
is chosen) can be written as
P pkB =
∑
i∈[0,q]
Pr[i chosen] · ∑
(j,y)∈S:j=i
qy(|φpkj 〉)

=1
q
∑
i∈[0,q]
∑
(j,y)∈S:j=i
qy(|φpkj 〉)
=1
q
∑
(i,y)∈S
qy(|φpki 〉) =
1
q
δpk
So we can see that pk ≤ 4q
√
P pkB . Then
 =
∑
pk
Ppkpk ≤ 4q
∑
pk
Ppk
√
P pkB
(∗)
≤ 4q
√∑
pk
PpkP
pk
B = 4q
√
PB ,
where (*) applies Jensen’s inequality. Finally, notice that B can be viewed as an adversary
in the witness-search game WS(Samp). Therefore, we conclude that pB ≤ negl(n) by the
hypothesis that WS(Samp) is hard and hence |PrG[b = 1]− PrG′ [b = 1]| ≤ negl(n). J
